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Abstract 
 
Several studies report that abnormal returns associated with short-term reversal 
investment strategies diminish once trading costs are taken into account. We show 
that the impact of trading costs on the strategies’ profitability can largely be attributed 
to excessively trading in small cap stocks. Limiting the stock universe to large cap 
stocks significantly reduces trading costs. Applying a more sophisticated portfolio 
construction algorithm to lower turnover reduces trading costs even further. Our 
finding that reversal strategies generate 30 to 50 basis points per week net of trading 
costs poses a serious challenge to standard rational asset pricing models. Our findings 
also have important implications for the understanding and practical implementation 
of reversal strategies.  
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1. Introduction 
A growing body of literature argues that the short-term reversal anomaly (i.e., the 
phenomenon that stocks with relatively low (high) returns over the past month or 
week earn positive (negative) abnormal returns in the following month or week) 
documented by Rosenberg, Reid and Lanstein (1985), Jegadeesh (1990), and 
Lehmann (1990) can be attributed to trading frictions in securities markets that 
weaken the arbitrage mechanism. Kaul and Nimalendran (1990), Ball, Kothari and 
Wasley (1995) and Conrad, Gultekin and Kaul (1997) report that most of short-term 
reversal profits fall within bid-ask bounds. And more recently, Avramov, Chordia and 
Goyal (2006) evaluate the profitability of reversal investment strategies net of trading 
costs using the model of Keim and Madhavan (1997). They find that reversal 
strategies require frequent trading in disproportionately high-cost securities such that 
trading costs prevent profitable strategy execution. Based on these results one might 
conclude that the abnormal returns associated with reversal investment strategies that 
are documented in earlier studies create an illusion of profitable investment strategies 
when, in fact, none exist. The seemingly lack of profitability of reversal investment 
strategies is consistent with market efficiency.  
In this study we show that this argument is not necessarily true. We argue that 
the reported impact of trading costs on reversal profits can largely be attributed to 
excessively trading in small cap stocks.  When stocks are ranked on past returns, 
stocks with the highest volatility have the greatest probability to end up in the extreme 
quantiles. These stocks are typically the stocks with the smallest market 
capitalizations. Therefore a portfolio that is long-short in the extreme quantiles is 
typically invested in the smallest stocks. However, these stocks are also the most 
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expensive to trade and reversal profits may be fully diminished by the 
disproportionally higher trading costs. 
At the same time, the turnover of standard reversal strategies is excessively 
high. Reversal portfolios are typically constructed by taking a long position in loser 
stocks and short position in winner stocks based on past returns. Then, at a pre-
specified interval the portfolios are rebalanced and stocks that are no longer losers are 
sold and replaced by newly bottom-ranked stocks. Vice versa, stocks that are no 
longer winners are bought back and replaced by newly top-ranked stocks. While this 
approach is standard in the stream of literature on empirical asset pricing to 
investigate stock market anomalies, it is suboptimal when the profitability of an 
investment strategy is evaluated and trading costs are incorporated. 
To investigate the impact of small cap stocks and rebalancing rules on the 
profitability of reversal strategies, we design and test three hypotheses: first, we gauge 
the profitability of reversal strategies applied to various market cap segments of the 
U.S. stock market. Our hypothesis is that the reported impact of trading costs on 
reversal profits can largely be attributed to excessively trading in small cap stocks and 
that limiting the stock universe to large cap stocks significantly reduces trading costs. 
Our second hypothesis is that trading costs can be reduced even further without giving 
up too much of the gross reversal profits when a slightly more sophisticated portfolio 
construction algorithm is applied. Third, we extend our analyses of reversal profits 
within different segments of the U.S. market with an analysis across different markets 
and evaluate the profitability of reversal strategies in European stocks markets. Our 
hypothesis is that trading costs have a larger impact on reversal profits in European 
markets since these markets are less liquid. For robustness, we also evaluate reversal 
profits across various market cap segments of the European stock markets. 
  
 3 
Throughout our study we use trading cost estimates resulting from the Keim 
and Madhavan (1997) model and estimates that were provided to us by Nomura 
Securities, one of world’s largest stock brokers. Consistent with Avramov, Chordia 
and Goyal (2006) we find that the profits of a standard reversal strategy are smaller 
than the likely trading costs for a broad universe that includes small cap stocks. At the 
same time we find that the impact of trading costs on short-term reversal profits 
becomes substantially lower once we exclude small cap stocks that are the most 
expensive to trade. In fact, when we focus on the largest U.S. stocks we document 
significant reversal profits up to 30 basis points per week. 
When we also apply a slightly more sophisticated portfolio construction 
algorithm and do not directly sell (buy back) stocks that are no longer losers (winners) 
but wait until these stocks are ranked among the top (bottom) 50 percent of stocks 
based on past returns, the turnover and trading costs of the strategy more than halve 
and we find even larger reversal profits up to 50 basis points per week. This number is 
highly significant from both a statistical and an economical point of view. 
Additionally, we find that trading costs have a larger impact on reversal profits 
in European markets. While standard reversal strategies based on a broad universe of 
European stocks yield gross returns of 50 basis points per week, their returns net of 
trading costs are highly negative. Once we exclusively focus on the largest stocks and 
apply the “smart” portfolio construction rules, we document significantly positive net 
reversal profits up to 20 basis points per week. 
In addition, we look at various other aspects of the reversal strategy to evaluate 
if the strategy can be applied in practice. Amongst others, we document that the 
reversal effect can be exploited by a sizable strategy with a trade size of one million 
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USD per stock; and that the strategy also earned large positive net returns over the 
post-decimalization era of U.S. stock markets.  
We deem that our study contributes to the existing literature in at least two 
important ways. First of all, our finding that reversal strategies yield significant 
returns net of trading costs presents a serious challenge to standard rational asset 
pricing models. Our findings also have important implications for the practical 
implementation of reversal strategies. The key lesson is that investors striving to earn 
superior returns by engaging in reversal trading are more likely to realize their 
objectives by using portfolio construction rules that limit turnover and by trading in 
liquid stocks with relatively low trading costs. Our study adds to the vast amount of 
literature on short-term reversal or contrarian strategies [see, e.g., Fama (1965), 
Jegadeesh (1990), Lehmann (1990), Lo and MacKinlay (1990), Jegadeesh and Titman 
(1995a,b), Chan (2003), Subrahmanyam (2005), and Gutierrez and Kelley (2008)]. 
Our work is also related and contributes to a recent strand in the literature that re-
examines market anomalies after incorporating transaction costs [see, e.g., Lesmond, 
Schill and Zhou (2004), Korajczyk and Sadka (2004), Avramov, Chordia and Goyal 
(2006) and Chordia, Goyal, Sadka, Sadka and Shivakumar (2009)].  
Our results also have important implications for several explanations that have 
been put forward in the literature to explain the reversal anomaly. In particular, our 
finding that net reversal profits are large and positive among large cap stocks over the 
most recent decade in our sample, during which market liquidity dramatically 
increased, rules out the explanation that reversals are induced by inventory 
imbalances by market makers and that the contrarian profits are a compensation for 
bearing inventory risks [see, e.g., Jegadeesh and Titman (1995b)]. Also, our finding 
that reversal profits are not convincingly larger for the 1,500 largest U.S. stocks than 
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for the 500 and even 100 largest stocks is inconsistent with the notion that 
nonsynchronous trading contributes to contrarian profits [see, e.g., Lo and MacKinlay 
(1990) and Boudoukh, Richardson and Whitelaw (1994)] as this explanation predicts 
a size-related lead-lag-effect in stock returns and higher reversal profits among small 
cap stocks. 
Our second main contribution is that we not only employ the trading costs 
estimates from the Keim and Madhavan (1997) model that are typically used in this 
stream of literature, but that we also use estimates that were provided to us by 
Nomura Securities. Despite the fact that most researchers now seem to acknowledge 
the importance of taking trading costs into account when evaluating the profitability 
of investment strategies, only very little is documented in the academic literature on 
how these costs should be modelled. Perhaps the most authoritative research in this 
field is the work of Keim and Madhavan who modelled market impact as well as 
commission costs for trading NYSE-AMEX stocks during 1991 to 1993. However, 
since markets have undergone important changes over time one may wonder if the 
parameter estimates of Keim and Madhavan can be used to estimate trading costs 
accurately also over more recent periods. Another concern with the Keim and 
Madhavan model relates to the functional form that is imposed on the relation 
between market capitalization and trading costs. Later in the paper we provide some 
detailed examples which indicate that trading costs estimates resulting from the Keim 
and Madhavan model should be interpreted with caution in some cases because of 
these issues. For example, the model systematically yields negative cost estimates for 
a large group of stocks over the most recent period. We believe that our study makes a 
significant contribution to the literature on evaluating the profitability of investment 
strategies by providing a comprehensive overview of trading costs estimates from 
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Nomura Securities for S&P1500 and S&P500 stocks during the period 1990 to 2009. 
Moreover, the trading cost schemes we publish in this study are set up in such a way 
that other researchers can employ them in their studies as the schemes merely require 
readily-available volume data for their usage. 
An additional attractive feature of the trading cost model used by Nomura 
Securities is that it has also been calibrated using European trade data. This enables us 
to investigate trading costs and reversal profits in European equity markets as well. To 
our best knowledge, this study is the first to provide a comprehensive overview of 
trading costs and to investigate trading cost impact on reversal profits in European 
equity markets. 
 
2. Stock data  
For our U.S. stock data we use return data for the 1,500 largest stocks that are 
constituents of the Citigroup U.S. Broad Market Index (BMI) during the period 
January 1990 and December 2009. We intentionally leave out micro cap stocks from 
our sample that are sometimes included in other studies to ensure that our findings are 
not driven by market micro-structure concerns. For our European stock data we use 
return data for the 1,000 largest stocks that were constituents of the Citigroup 
European Broad Market Index during the period January 1995 and December 2009. 
The reason why we start in 1995 instead of 1990 as we do in our analysis using U.S. 
data is that the trading cost model of Nomura is not accurately calibrated to estimate 
trading costs for European stocks before 1995. Daily stock returns including 
dividends, market capitalizations and price volumes are obtained from the FactSet 
Global Prices database.1  
                                               
1
 FactSet Global Prices is a hiqh-quality securities database offered by FactSet Research Systems Inc. 
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We visually inspect various measures of liquidity for both stock markets, 
including market capitalization, daily trading volumes, turnover, and Amihud’s 
(2002) illiquidity measure.2 When we compare our U.S. sample to the one studied by 
Avramov, Chordia and Goyal (2006), our sample seems to be more liquid. For 
example, when we consider the stocks’ illiquidity in our sample we find a median 
illiquidity measure of 0.02 in 1990 that decreases to 0.001 in 2009. Avramov, Chordia 
and Goyal (2006) report this figure to be 0.05 for the most liquid group of stocks in 
their sample. For the least liquid group of stocks the authors even report average 
illiquidity of 10.8. This figure basically implies that the price impact resulting from 
trading one million USD in these stocks is roughly 10 percent. We do not observe 
such large numbers for illiquidity in our sample. We believe that the largest portion of 
the differences in liquidity between our sample and that of Avramov, Chordia and 
Goyal (2006) can be attributed to the fact that we investigate a more recent period of 
time during which markets were much more liquid. In addition, our sample does not 
include micro cap stocks. 
 Next, we compare the liquidity of the European stock markets to that of the 
U.S. stock market. It appears that the European markets also have been liquid over our 
sample period, but that the illiquidity level is higher than for the U.S. market: the 
median illiquidity measure is 0.004 in 2009 for the European markets, while this 
figure is 0.001 for the U.S. stocks.  
 
3. Trading cost estimates 
Consistent with most of the literature we use the trading cost model of Keim and 
Madhavan (1997) to estimate net reversal profits for our first analyses. These trading 
                                               
2
 For the sake of brevity, we do not report these results in tabular form. 
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cost estimates include commissions paid as well as an estimate of the price impact of 
the trades. Keim and Madhavan regress total trading costs on several characteristics of 
the trade and the traded stock. Appendix A provides a more detailed description of the 
Keim and Madhaven model. 
An important caveat that should be taken into account when using the Keim 
and Madhavan (1997) model is that its coefficients are estimated over the period 
January 1991 through March 1993. Since markets have undergone important changes 
over time one may wonder if estimates resulting from the Keim and Madhavan model 
are also accurate over more recent periods. For example, after two centuries pricing in 
fractions, the NYSE and AMEX converted all of their stocks to decimal pricing in 
2001 which led to a large decrease in bid-ask spreads on both exchanges. Also, 
increasing trading volumes over time; more competition among stock brokers; and 
technological improvements may have had an important impact on bid-ask spreads, 
market impact costs and commissions. 
To cope with this issue, we asked one of world’s largest stock brokers, 
Nomura Securities, if they could provide us with trading cost estimates for stocks that 
are constituents of the S&P1500 index over our sample period January 1990 through 
December 2009. The Nomura trading cost model is calibrated in every quarter over 
the period 1995 to 2009. Appendix B provides a detailed description of the Nomura 
model. As estimates for broker commissions a 5 basis points rate per trade is used 
during the 1990s and a 3 basis points rate over the most recent 10 years of our sample 
period.  
An important aspect that came to light in our conversations with the 
researchers from Nomura is that trading style may have a significant impact on 
trading costs. For example, technical traders that follow momentum-like strategies 
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and have a great demand for immediacy typically experience large bid-ask costs since 
the market demand for the stocks they aim to buy is substantially larger than the 
supply, and vice versa for sell transactions. In their study, Keim and Madhavan (1997) 
also find that technical traders generally experience higher trading costs than traders 
whose strategies demand less immediacy like value traders or index managers. The 
researchers of Nomura told us that the trading costs that are associated with a reversal 
strategy are likely to be somewhat lower than the estimates they provided since a 
reversal strategy by nature buys (sells) stocks for which the market supply (demand) 
is larger than the demand (supply). However, they could not provide us with an exact 
number to correct for this feature of reversal strategies. To be conservative we assume 
that there is no liquidity-provision premium involved with reversal trading. 
We asked the researchers of Nomura to provide us with aggregated data in the 
form of average trading costs for decile portfolios of S&P1500 stocks sorted on their 
dollar volumes in each quarter during the period January 1990 to December 2009.3 
Trading cost estimates for an individual stock can now be derived using the stock’s 
volume rank at a particular point in time. An attractive feature of this approach is that 
it only requires readily-available volume data, and not proprietary intraday data. The 
trading cost schemes we publish in this study also enable other researchers to employ 
the Nomura trading cost estimates in their studies. We also asked them to assume that 
the trades are closed within one day and the trade size is one million USD per stock 
by the end of 2009. The trade size is deflated back in time with 10 percent per annum. 
The assumption of such a large trade size ensures that any effects we document can be 
exploited by a sizable strategy. For example, a strategy that is long-short in the 20 
percent losers and winners of the largest 1,500 U.S. stocks and trades one million 
                                               
3
 Because the S&P1500 Index started in 1995, we asked the researchers of Nomura to backfill their 
series of trading cost estimates using the 1,500 largest stocks that are constituents of the Russell Index 
over the period January 1990 to December 1994.  
  
 10 
USD per stock employs a capital of USD 300 million by the end of 2009. We use the 
same trade sizes when using the Keim and Madhavan (1997) model to estimate 
trading costs.  
Table 1 presents an overview of the trading cost estimates we received from 
Nomura for S&P1500 stocks and also lists the estimates for our sample of the 1,500 
largest U.S. stocks resulting from the Keim and Madhavan (1997) model. 
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
The table presents the average single-trip costs of buy and sell transactions in basis 
points for each year in our sample for decile portfolios of stocks sorted on their three-
month median dollar trading volume.  
Panel A of Table 1 reports the cost estimates resulting from the Keim and 
Madhavan (1997) model. The cost estimates for our sample of stocks during the 
period 1991 to 1993 seem to be close to the estimates reported by Keim and 
Madhavan for the median stock (see Table 3 of their paper). However, there are also a 
few notable observations. We find negative cost estimates for the most liquid stocks 
with the largest trading volumes. The number of stocks with negative trading cost 
estimates also increases over time. In fact, the Keim and Madhavan model yields 
negative cost estimates for almost half of the stocks in our sample during 2007. Panel 
B of Table 1 reports the trading cost estimates that were provided to us by Nomura for 
S&P1500 stocks. Interestingly, Nomura’s cost estimates appear not only to be higher 
for the most liquid stocks with the highest trading volumes, but also for the least 
liquid stocks with the lowest trading volumes. For these stocks the cost estimates of 
Nomura can be up to six times higher than those resulting from the Keim and 
Madhavan model. 
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
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Once we focus on the 500 largest stocks in our sample, the differences 
between the trading cost estimates resulting from the Keim and Madhavan (1997) 
model and the Nomura model become even more extreme. Panel A of Table 2 reports 
the cost estimates resulting from the Keim and Madhavan model and Panel B the cost 
estimates that were provided to us by Nomura. We immediately observe that the cost 
estimates resulting from the Keim and Madhaven model for our sample of large cap 
stocks are very low and even negative in a lot of cases. In fact, for a large number of 
years in our sample, trading cost estimates are negative for basically all stocks. In 
addition, for all deciles, Nomura’s cost estimates are substantially higher than the 
estimates resulting from the Keim and Madhavan model. Based on the Keim and 
Madhavan model, the average single-trip transaction costs for the 10 percent most 
expensive stocks to trade are 4 basis points. This figure is substantially lower than the 
6 basis points trading costs that result from the Nomura model for the 10 percent 
cheapest stocks.  
We offer the following explanations for these notable differences. First, the 
differences may be caused by the fact that the model of Nomura imposes a quadratic 
relation between trading volume and transaction costs while the Keim and Madhaven 
(1997) model imposes a logarithmic relation. While the economic intuition behind 
both approaches is that they try to mimic the shape of the limit order book that is deep 
in the front (at the best bid/offer price) and gets increasingly shallower as prices move 
away from the current price by imposing a convex relation between cost and volume 
[see, e.g., Rou (2009)], an attractive feature of the quadratic relation over the 
logarithmic relation is that cost estimates cannot become negative for the most liquid 
stocks. When a logarithmic relation is imposed trading cost estimates can become 
negative. Second, the Keim and Madhavan model uses a constant negative coefficient 
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for market capitalization. Because the average market capitalization increased 
significantly in our sample, cost estimates become lower over time. It should be 
stressed here that we did not apply scaling techniques on the coefficient estimates in 
the Keim and Madhavan model as is typically done in this stream of literature to 
inflate trading costs back in time [see, e.g., Gutierrez and Kelley (2008) and 
Avramov, Chordia and Goyal (2006)]. If we would have applied these scaling 
techniques, the resulting cost estimates would be even lower. The Nomura model can 
adjust to changing market conditions in our sample because it is periodically 
recalibrated. 
The observation that trading cost estimates resulting from the Keim and 
Madhavan (1997) model are substantially lower than the Nomura cost estimates (and 
even negative in many cases) makes us believe that the trading cost estimates 
resulting from the Keim and Madhavan model should be interpreted with caution in 
some of our analyses. Of course, it should be acknowledged that the Keim and 
Madhavan model was originally developed to describe the in-sample relation between 
trading costs and stock characteristics, and not to predict stocks' out-of-sample trading 
costs for evaluating trading strategies. Imposing a quadratic instead of a logarithmic 
relation between market capitalization and trading costs would probably not increase 
the in-sample explanatory power of the model. The Keim and Madhavan model is 
therefore probably optimally specified for the purpose it was originally developed for. 
An additional attractive feature of the trading cost model we obtained from 
Nomura Securities is that it has also been calibrated using European trade data over 
the period 1995 to 2009 which enables us to investigate trading costs and reversal 
profits in these markets. To our best knowledge, this study is the first to provide a 
comprehensive overview of trading costs and to investigate trading cost impact on 
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reversal profits in European equity markets. The lower liquidity of the European 
markets makes us expect that trading costs in Europe are higher than in the U.S. For 
comparison, we list the trading costs estimates we obtained from Nomura Securities 
for the largest 1,000 and 600 European stocks in Table 3. We asked the researchers of 
Nomura to use the same settings to compute trading costs in Europe as they used to 
compute trading costs in the U.S. 
 [INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
When we compare the trading costs estimates for the 1,500 largest U.S. stocks to 
those for the 1,000 largest European stocks in Panel A of Table 3, it appears that 
trading costs are indeed higher in Europe. For example, the trading costs of the 10 
percent least liquid stocks are 76 basis points for European stocks, while the costs are 
64 basis points for U.S. stocks. The differences become larger when we move to the 
more liquid segment of the market. For the 10 percent most liquid stocks, trading 
costs are even three times higher in Europe compared to the U.S. When we consider 
trading cost estimates for the 600 largest European stocks in Panel B of Table 3, we 
observe a very similar pattern in the sense that the most liquid U.S. stocks are 
significantly less expensive to trade. 
 
4. Main empirical results 
4.1. Reversal profits across different market cap segments 
In our first analysis we evaluate reversal profits for the 1,500, 500, and 100 largest 
U.S. stocks. Our hypothesis is that the reported impact of trading costs on reversal 
profits can largely be attributed to excessively trading in small cap stocks and that 
limiting the stock universe to large cap stocks significantly reduces trading costs. 
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Reversal portfolios are constructed by daily sorting all available stocks into 
mutually exclusive quintile portfolios based on their past-week returns (i.e., five 
trading days). We assign equal weights to the stocks in each quintile. The reversal 
strategy is long (short) in the 20 percent of stocks with the lowest (highest) returns 
over the past week. To control for the bid-ask bounces, we skip one day after each 
ranking before we construct portfolios. Portfolios are rebalanced at a daily frequency.  
We compute the gross and net returns of the long portfolio, the short portfolio, and the 
long-short portfolio in excess of the equally-weighted return of all stocks in the cross-
section. In addition, we compute the long-short portfolios’ turnover per week. We 
compute net returns for each stock at each point in time by taking the trading cost 
estimates listed in Tables 1 and 2. We impose that the minimum trading cost estimates 
resulting from the Keim and Madhavan (1997) model are zero to be conservative.  
[INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
We first consider the results for a standard reversal strategy using the 1,500 largest 
U.S. stocks in Panel A of Table 4. Consistent with most of the literature we find that 
this strategy yields extremely large gross returns. More specifically, a reversal 
investment strategy that is long in the 20 percent stocks with the lowest one-week 
returns and short in the 20 percent with the highest returns earns a gross return of 61.7 
basis points per week. 
However, at the same time the reversal strategy has an extremely high 
portfolio turnover of 677 percent per week.4 We find that the average holding period 
of a stock is less than three days. Once trading costs are taken into account the 
profitability of the reversal strategy completely diminishes. When we take Keim and 
Madhavan (1997) trading cost estimates, we document a net return of minus 66.1 
                                               
4
 The maximum turnover of a long-short portfolio is 400 percent per day. 
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basis points per week. And when we use the Nomura cost estimates, we even find a 
return of minus 103.7 basis points per week. These results are consistent with the 
findings of Avramov, Chordia and Goyal (2006). 
 One of the most notable observations in the previous section was that there is a 
highly non-linear relation between market capitalization/trading volume and trading 
costs such that the smallest and least liquid stocks are disproportionally expensive to 
trade. Especially since these stocks generally have the highest volatility and therefore 
have the greatest probability to end up in the extreme quantiles when stocks are 
ranked on past returns, a long-short reversal portfolio is typically invested in the 
stocks that are the most expensive to trade. While some studies report that stock 
anomalies are typically stronger among small cap stocks, one may wonder if the 
potentially higher returns of small cap stocks compensate for the higher trading costs 
of these stocks. 
 To investigate the impact of including small cap stocks, we consider the results 
for the 500 and 100 largest U.S. stocks in Panels B and C of Table 4, respectively. 
Interestingly, the reversal strategies for the largest 500 and 100 stocks earn slightly 
higher returns than the reversal strategy for the largest 1,500 stocks. Moreover, it 
appears that the impact of trading costs on the profitability of the strategy is much 
lower for our samples of large cap stocks. Given the large number of negative cost 
estimates we found using the Keim and Madhavan (1997) model for the largest 500 
stocks, it is not surprising to see that the net return of the reversal strategy computed 
using these cost estimates are very close to the strategy’s gross return since we impose 
minimum trading costs of zero. However, also when we use the trading cost estimates 
of Nomura, it appears that trading costs have a much smaller impact on reversal 
profits once small cap stocks are excluded. The net return of minus 3.0 basis points 
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per week of the strategy for the 500 largest stocks indicates that trading costs consume 
roughly 75 basis points of the strategy’s gross return. For the 100 largest stocks this 
figure is 53 basis points. For our sample of the 1,500 largest stocks trading impact is 
more than three times larger at 165 basis points.  
 The results from this analysis indicate that reversal profits are also observed 
among the largest stocks. In fact, reversal profits appear to be the highest among this 
group of stocks. Our finding that reversal strategies can yield a significant return of 
more than 30 basis points per week net of trading costs presents a serious challenge to 
standard rational asset pricing model and has important implications for the practical 
implementation of reversal investment strategies. The key lesson is that investors 
striving to earn superior returns by engaging in reversal trading are more likely to 
realize their objectives by trading in liquid stocks with relatively low transaction 
costs. 
 
4.2. Reducing reversal strategies’ turnover by “smart” portfolio construction 
Another important reason why trading costs have such a large impact on reversal 
profits has to do with the way the reversal portfolios are typically constructed. 
Reversal portfolios are constructed by taking a long position in losers and a short 
position in winners. Then, at a pre-specified interval the portfolio is rebalanced and 
stocks that are no longer losers are sold and replaced by newly bottom-ranked stocks. 
And vice versa, stocks that are no longer winners are bought back and replaced by 
newly top-ranked stocks. While this portfolio construction approach is standard in the 
academic literature to investigate stock market anomalies, it is suboptimal when a 
real-live investment strategy is evaluated and trading costs are taken into account. 
Namely, replacing stocks that are no longer losers (winners) by newly bottom (top)-
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ranked stocks only increases the profitability of reversal strategies if the difference in 
expected return between the stocks is larger than the costs associated with the 
transactions. 
In many cases, however, the costs of the rebalances will be larger than the 
incremental return that is earned by the stock replacements. For example, for our 
universe of the 1,500 largest stocks we found that past loser stocks on average earn a 
gross excess return of roughly 6 basis points over the subsequent day while stocks in 
the next quintile earn 1 basis point. On average, loser (winner) stocks remain ranked 
in the top (bottom) quintile for a period of three days. Consequently, replacing a stock 
that moved from the top quintile to the second quintile only increases the profitability 
of the reversal strategy if the costs of the buy and sell transactions are less than 15 [= 
(6 - 1) * 3] basis points together.  When we consider the trading cost estimates in 
Tables 1 and 2, however, we see that single-trip costs are larger than 7.5 basis points 
in many cases. Therefore a portfolio construction approach that directly sells (buys 
back) stocks that are no longer losers (winners) is likely to generate excessive 
turnover and unnecessarily high transaction costs. 
A naive approach to cope with this problem would be to lower the rebalancing 
frequency. However, with this approach one runs the risk to hold stocks that have 
already reverted. Namely, a loser (winner) stock at a specific point in time might rank 
among the winner (loser) stocks within the interval at which the portfolio is 
rebalanced and might therefore have a negative (positive) expected return. In fact, the 
portfolio weights of loser stocks that have reverted become larger and thereby 
exacerbate this effect.  
We propose a slightly more sophisticated approach that waits to sell (buy 
back) stocks until they are ranked among the 50 percent of winner (loser) stocks 
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ranked on past return. These stocks are then replaced by the stocks with the lowest 
(highest) past-week return at that time and not yet included in the portfolio. As a 
consequence, this "smart" approach has a substantially lower turnover than the 
standard approach to construct long-short reversal portfolios. It is important to note 
that our “smart” approach holds the same number of stocks in the portfolio as the 
standard approach, but that the holding period with the “smart” approach is flexible 
for each stock with a minimum of one day and a maximum of theoretically infinity.  
 We now use the slightly more sophisticated portfolio construction approach 
outlined above to evaluate reversal profits for our samples of the 1,500, 500, and 100 
largest U.S. stocks. Our hypothesis is that trading costs can significantly be reduced 
without giving up too much of the gross reversal profits when our slightly more 
sophisticated portfolio construction algorithm is applied. 
[INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
We first consider the results for our sample of the 1,500 largest stocks in Panel A of 
Table 5. Indeed, the “smart” portfolio construction approach appears to successfully 
reduce turnover and thereby the impact of trading costs on reversal profits. While the 
turnover of the standard reversal strategy for the 1,500 largest stocks is 677 percent 
per week, this figure is 325 percent for the “smart” approach. We find that the 
effective holding period of a stock on average is approximately six days for this 
strategy. And while trading costs, estimated using the Keim and Madhavan (1997) 
model, consume 128 basis points of reversal gross returns of the standard reversal 
strategy, this figure is 61 basis points for the “smart” approach. We find a similar 
impact when we use the Nomura trading cost estimates. While trading costs consume 
165 basis points for the standard reversal strategy, this figure is 77 basis points for the 
“smart” approach. All in all, it appears that using a slightly more sophisticated 
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portfolio construction approach when engaging in short-term reversal strategies can 
have a significant impact on trading costs. 
 Next, we consider the results for the 500 and 100 largest U.S. stocks in Panels 
B and C of Table 5. Also for these samples we see that the “smart” portfolio 
construction approach appears to successfully reduce turnover. More specifically, 
while the standard reversal strategies have turnovers of 688 and 711 percent per week, 
these figures are 326 and 337 percent for the “smart” reversal strategies applied on the 
500 and 100 largest stocks, respectively. Interestingly, the gross returns of the “smart” 
strategies are only marginally lower than the returns we observed earlier for the 
standard reversal strategies. When net returns are computed using the Nomura model 
we find that trading costs now consume only 34 basis points of the strategy’s gross 
return for the 500 largest U.S. stocks. This figure is 75 basis points for the standard 
reversal strategy. We observe a similar reduction for our sample of the 100 largest 
U.S. stocks. The resulting reversal profits range between 30 and 50 basis points per 
week  and are highly significant from both a statistical as an economical point of 
view.  
 
4.3. Reversal profits in European markets 
Proceeding further we evaluate reversal profits in European stocks markets. Only a 
small number of studies have investigated short-term reversal strategies in non-US 
equity markets. Chang, McLeavey and Rhee (1995) find abnormal profits of short-
term contrarian strategies in the Japanese stock market. Schiereck, DeBondt and 
Weber (1999) and Hameed and Ting (2000) find the same in the German and 
Malaysian stock markets, respectively. And Griffin, Kelly and Nardari (2010) 
investigate reversal profits in 56 developed and emerging countries.  
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Because European markets are less liquid than the U.S. market we expect the 
impact of trading costs on reversal profits to be larger in Europe. Using the 
methodology outlined in the previous section, we construct quintile portfolios for the 
1,000, 600 and 100 largest European stocks to compute the returns of long-short 
reversal portfolios. Additionally, we apply the “smart” portfolio construction for these 
stock samples. For all reversal strategies we compute gross returns, and returns net of 
trading costs using the estimates from the Nomura model listed in Table 3. The results 
of this analysis are presented in Table 6. 
[INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE] 
It appears that gross reversal profits are also very large in Europe and in the same 
order of magnitude as in the U.S. However, as we expected, the impact of trading 
costs appears to be larger in Europe. For our universes of the 1,000 and 600 largest 
European stocks we do not find positive returns net of trading costs. Only when we 
exclusively focus on the 100 largest stocks and apply the “smart” portfolio 
construction, we document significantly positive net reversal profits up to 20 basis 
points per week. 
All in all, the European results exhibit the same features as our U.S. results: 
once we move more towards the large cap segment of the market and limit turnover 
by “smart” portfolio construction, reversal strategies yield significant returns net of 
trading costs. At the same time, trading costs have a larger impact on reversal profits 
in Europe than in the U.S. 
 
5. Follow-up empirical analyses 
5.1. Weekly rebalancing 
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In our first follow-up empirical analysis we evaluate a naive portfolio construction 
approach that reduces the turnover of reversal strategies by decreasing the rebalancing 
frequency to five days. All the other settings are exactly the same as with the standard 
approach. As mentioned earlier, the main disadvantage of this approach compared to 
the "smart" portfolio construction approach described in the previous section is that 
one runs the risk to hold stocks that have already reverted. We evaluate this portfolio 
construction approach for our samples of the largest 1,500, 500 and 100 largest U.S. 
stocks. The results are in Table 7. 
[INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE] 
It appears that using a five-day rebalancing frequency indeed substantially lowers 
portfolio turnover. For example, the turnover of the standard reversal strategy for the 
1,500 largest stocks is 677 percent per week. This figure is 306 percent per week 
using a five-day rebalancing frequency. Also for our samples of the largest 500 and 
100 stocks, the turnover of reversal strategies that use a five-day rebalancing 
frequency is less than half of the turnover of strategies that rebalance at a daily 
frequency. As a consequence, the impact of trading costs is substantially lower for 
these strategies. Nonetheless, the net returns of the weekly reversal strategy for the 
1,500 largest stocks are significantly negative because the gross returns of the strategy 
are also much lower than for the daily strategy. While the daily strategy yields a gross 
return of 61.7 basis points per week, the weekly strategy yields only 41.2 basis points. 
For our samples of the largest 500 and 100 stocks we observe similar effects: trading 
costs become substantially lower when the rebalancing frequency is decreased to five 
days, but so do gross returns. The effects seem to offset each other such that net 
reversal profits remain in the same order of magnitude. 
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5.2. Subperiod analyses 
We continue our empirical analysis by performing two subperiod analyses. First, we 
investigate reversal profits over the most recent decade in our sample (i.e., January 
2000 to December 2009). We conjecture that it might well be the case that the 
decimalization of the quotation systems and the increase in stock trading volumes 
have affected the profitability of reversal profits. Additionally, the Adaptive Market 
Hypothesis of Lo (2004) states that the public dissemination of an anomaly may affect 
its profitability. We conjecture that it could well be the case that increased investment 
activities by professional investors such as hedge funds have arbitraged away a large 
portion of the anomalous profits of reversal strategies after publications on the 
reversal effect in the 1990s. The results of this analysis are presented in Panels A, B 
and C in Table 8. 
[INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE] 
It appears that the net profitability of our “smart” reversal investment strategy is quite 
constant over our sample period. For the 1,500 largest stocks, the “smart” reversal 
strategy yields a negative net return of minus 27.9 basis points per week in the most 
recent decade. For our sample of the 500 largest stocks, the net return decreased from 
30.5 to 22.1 basis points per week. And for our sample of the largest 100 stocks, the 
net return slightly increased from 53.1 basis points to 59.0 basis points per week. 
In our second subperiod analysis we evaluate reversal profits when leaving out 
the dotcom bubble years (i.e., January 1999 to December 2001) and the credit crisis 
(i.e., January 2008 to December 2009) from our sample. Our concern is that the 
trading cost models we employ underestimate costs during crises periods and reversal 
profits are exacerbated. The results of this analysis are reported in Panels D, E, and F 
of Table 8. Observing net reversal profits of minus 17.8, 23.2 and 34.8 basis points 
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per week for the 1,500, 500 and 100 largest U.S. stocks, respectively, we conclude 
that the reversal profits are constant over time and also highly profitable during non-
crises periods.  
 
5.3. “Smart” portfolio construction using alternative trade rules 
Next we examine the sensitivity of our findings to alternate portfolio construction rule 
choices. More specifically, we evaluate reversal profits for the 500 largest U.S. stocks 
that sell (buy back) stocks once their rank on past-week return is above (below) the 
30th (70th) percentile; the 40th (60th) percentile; the 60th (40th) percentile; the 70th 
(30th) percentile; and the 80th (20th) percentile.  
[INSERT TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE] 
The results in Panel A of Table 9 point out that reducing portfolio turnover has a large 
impact on net reversal profits. Once we require loser (winner) stocks with a rank 
above (below) the 30th (70th) percentile to be sold (bought back), net reversal profits 
become highly significant at 20.1 basis points per week. This compares to minus 3 
basis points per week for the standard reversal strategy (see Table 4). While gross 
returns become somewhat lower when turnover is reduced, the impact of trading costs 
on performance becomes substantially smaller at the same time. The optimum in 
terms of net return is reached using a trade rule that sells (buys back) stocks once their 
rank on past-week return is above (below) the 70th (30th) percentile. Interestingly, it 
appears that reversal profits are both statistically and economically highly significant 
for all trade rules, ranging from 20.1 to 35.3 basis points per week. We can therefore 
safely conclude that our findings are robust to our choice of trade rule. 
 
5.4. Fama-French regressions 
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To investigate to which extent reversal profits can be attributed to exposures to 
common risk factors we regress gross and net returns of the “smart” long-short 
reversal portfolios for the largest 1,500, 500 and 100 U.S. stocks on the Fama-French 
risk factors (French, 2010) for market, size and value [see, e.g., Fama and French 
(1993, 1995, 1996)]: 
(1)  iitttti HMLbSMBbsRMRFbar ,321, ε++++= , 
where tir ,  is the return on reversal strategy i in month t, tRMRF , tSMB  and tHML  are 
the returns on factor-mimicking portfolios for the market, size and value in month t, 
respectively, a , 1b , 2b  and 3b  are parameters to be estimated, and ti,ε  is the residual 
return of strategy i in month t. The coefficient estimates and adjusted R-squared 
values from these regressions are listed in Table 10. 
[INSERT TABLE 10 ABOUT HERE] 
Panel A presents the results for the 1,500 largest U.S. stocks, Panel B presents the 
results for the 500 largest U.S. stocks, and Panel C presents the results for the 100 
largest U.S. stocks. In all cases the explanatory power of the Fama-French risk factors 
is very small. The highest adjusted R-squared value we observe is 5 percent. We 
conclude that reversal profits are unrelated to exposures to common risk factors. 
 
6. Implications for explanations for reversal effects 
Our findings have important implications for explanations that have been put forward 
in the literature to explain the reversal anomaly. Short-term stock reversals are 
sometimes regarded as evidence that the market lacks sufficient liquidity to offset 
price effects caused by unexpected buying and selling pressure and that market 
makers set prices in part to control their inventories. Grossman and Miller (1988) and 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1995b) argue that the reversals are induced by inventory 
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imbalances by market makers and the contrarian profits are a compensation for 
bearing inventory risks. Related to this stream of literature, Madhavan and Smidt 
(1993), Hasbrouck and Sofianos (1993), Hansch, Naik and Viswanathan (1998), and 
Hendershott and Seasholes (2006) find that prices quoted by dealers are inversely 
related to their inventory supporting the notion that dealers actively manage their 
inventories. This liquidity explanation projects that reversals should have become 
smaller over time since market liquidity dramatically increased. It also predicts that 
reversals are stronger for small cap stocks than large cap stocks that typically have 
lower turnover. In fact, under the liquidity hypothesis reversals may even not be 
present among large cap stocks at all. However, our findings that net reversal profits 
are large and positive for the 500 and 100 largest U.S. stocks and did not diminish 
over the second decade in our sample rules out this explanation.  
Another explanation for reversal effects that has been put forward in the 
literature is from Lo and MacKinlay (1990) and Boudoukh, Richardson and Whitelaw 
(1994) who note that nonsynchronous trading contributes to contrarian profits. This 
explanation assumes information diffuses gradually in financial markets and that large 
cap stocks react more quickly to information than small cap stocks that are covered by 
fewer analysts. As a consequence of this, the returns of large cap stocks might lead the 
returns of small cap stocks. However, our finding that reversal profits are smaller for 
the 1,500 largest U.S. stocks than for the 500 and 100 largest stocks is inconsistent 
with this explanation since nonsynchronous trading predicts a size-related lead-lag-
effect in stock returns and higher reversal profits among small cap stocks. 
 The only explanation that has been put forward in the literature whose 
projections are not inconsistent with our findings is the behavioural explanation that 
market prices tend to overreact to information in the short run [see, e.g., Jegadeesh 
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and Titman (1995a)]. It should be stressed that our study does not provide any direct 
evidence supporting this behavioural hypothesis. Of course, it is not our goal to 
explain the reversal effect in this study; our main point is to show that reversal profits 
are present after trading costs. Nonetheless, we believe that our results help to better 
understand the reversal anomaly since it rules out several competing explanations that 
have been put forward in the literature.  
 
7. Summary and concluding comments 
This paper shows that the finding that trading costs prevent profitable execution of 
reversal investment strategies can largely be attributed to excessively trading in small 
cap stocks. Excluding small cap stocks and applying a slightly more sophisticated 
portfolio construction approach to reduce turnover when engaging in reversal trading 
has a tremendous impact on the returns that reversal investment strategies deliver net 
of transaction costs. Our finding that reversal strategies generate 30 to 50 basis points 
per week net of transaction costs poses a serious challenge to standard rational asset 
pricing models and has important implications for the practical implementation of 
reversal investment strategies. Our results also have important implications for several 
explanations that have been put forward in the literature to explain the reversal 
anomaly.  
Another important issue that came to light in this study is that trading cost 
estimates of the Keim and Madhavan (1997) model that are typically used in this 
stream of literature to evaluate the profitability of trading strategies net of transaction 
costs should be interpreted with caution in some cases. More specifically, it seems 
that cost estimates of this model are systematically biased downwards and can even 
become negative. The comprehensive overview presented in this study on trading 
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costs estimates resulting from the proprietary transaction cost model of Nomura 
Securities provides opportunities for future research to re-evaluate the profitability of 
investment strategies based on well-documented anomalies. 
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Appendix 
This appendix describes the Keim and Madhavan (1997) and the Nomura models we 
use throughout this study to estimate trading costs. 
 
A. Keim and Madhavan (1997) model 
As Avramov, Chordia and Goyal (2006) do in their study, we employ the regression 
results of Keim and Madhavan to estimate the transaction costs involved with reversal 
investment strategies. Using the results in Table 5 of Keim and Madhavan (1997) we 
obtain our estimates of buyer and seller trading costs: 
(2) 
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where i
BuyCˆ
 and iSellCˆ  are the estimated total trading costs for stock i in percent for 
either a buyer-initiated or seller-initiated order, respectively. iNASDAQD  is equal to one 
if stock i is a NASDAQ-traded stock and zero if stock i is traded on NYSE or AMEX, 
imcap is the market value outstanding of stock i, iTrsize  is the trade size of stock i, 
and iP  is the price per share of stock i. For our long portfolios we use i
BuyCˆ  to open 
the positions in the component stocks and iSellCˆ  to close the positions, vice versa for 
the short portfolios. Keim and Madhavan estimate the trading costs for 21 institutions 
from January 1991 through March 1993 using 62,333 trades.  
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B. Nomura model for trading costs 
The variables that are assumed to determine trading costs in the model developed by 
Nomura are spread, trade size, volume and volatility: 
(4) iii
i
ii volatilitybTrsize
volume
bspreadbaC ε++++= 3221
1
ˆ
 
where ispread  is the average bid-ask spread of stock i over the trading day, ivolume  
is the total executed volume for stock i over the trading day, iTrsize  is the trade size 
of stock i, and ivolatility  the intra-day return volatility of stock i over the trading day. 
The Nomura trading cost model is calibrated in every quarter over the period 1995 to 
2009. For each calibration, actual order flows in the previous 12 months for 
approximately 500,000 executed trades per time are used from the trading platform 
formerly owned by Lehman Brothers. Consistent with the approach of Keim and 
Madhavan (1997), the model of Nomura also adjusts for the relevant exchange by 
estimating the model coefficients per region and exchange [Tse and Devos (2004) and 
Gajewskia and Gresse (2007) report differences in trading costs between exchanges].  
 The model developed by Nomura estimates transaction costs by decomposing 
them into three components. The first component is the instantaneous impact due to 
crossing the bid-ask spread. The second component is the permanent impact which is 
the change in market equilibrium price due to executing a trade. Finally, the third 
component is the temporary impact which refers to a temporary movement of price 
away from equilibrium price because of short-term imbalances in supply and demand. 
The model does not take opportunity costs into account that result from unfilled 
trades.  
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TABLE 1. Transaction cost estimates for the 1,500 largest U.S. stocks. 
Table 1 presents an overview of the single-trip transaction cost estimates in basis 
points for volume deciles of our sample of the 1,500 largest U.S. stocks resulting from 
the Keim and Madhavan model (Panel A) and the estimates for volume deciles of 
S&P1500 stocks we received from Nomura Securities (Panel B). Volume deciles are 
based on stocks' three-month median trading volumes. It is assumed that the trades are 
closed within one day and the trade size is one million per stock by the end of 2009. 
The trade size is deflated back in time with 10 percent per annum. 
Volume 
Decile 19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
Av
er
a
ge
Panel A. Keim-Madhaven average buy and sell
D1 (bottom) 71 78 47 28 29 27 21 12 13 18 21 26 30 29 13 12 10 11 38 63 30
D2 82 74 53 32 33 30 20 10 14 20 27 29 38 36 15 13 9 8 37 66 32
D3 64 72 51 32 30 25 18 11 15 19 24 24 39 35 19 10 7 7 40 61 30
D4 56 53 38 30 32 25 15 12 14 18 21 29 42 32 19 15 6 8 34 58 28
D5 48 39 32 30 25 22 15 9 11 17 15 27 43 38 15 16 6 4 24 37 24
D6 38 29 23 22 20 14 10 8 8 11 15 23 41 26 14 11 6 1 16 34 18
D7 24 20 18 13 14 8 6 1 4 5 6 15 26 22 8 2 2 -6 15 28 11
D8 16 11 9 8 4 4 1 -3 -5 -6 0 13 14 10 2 -6 -11 -14 7 21 4
D9 0 -3 -5 -5 -2 -6 -6 -11 -12 -13 -10 0 3 0 -9 -17 -16 -21 -5 8 -7
D10 (top) -20 -20 -19 -19 -17 -19 -22 -26 -28 -31 -25 -14 -5 -11 -17 -25 -26 -31 -21 -15 -20
Panel B. Nomura buy or sell
D1 (bottom) 86 77 83 75 73 54 52 66 53 76 65 88 80 76 76 65 53 41 51 70 68
D2 72 60 60 55 51 34 27 35 31 65 67 61 56 50 41 30 24 20 25 50 46
D3 58 50 45 41 38 23 19 22 23 47 47 37 30 24 20 17 15 14 17 33 31
D4 48 41 36 30 30 17 12 18 18 30 28 23 20 17 14 13 12 11 13 23 23
D5 41 34 30 26 25 15 14 14 17 21 19 16 15 13 12 11 10 9 11 17 19
D6 33 26 22 21 20 13 13 12 14 16 14 13 12 11 10 9 9 8 9 14 15
D7 26 23 21 18 17 11 17 11 11 13 11 10 9 9 8 8 8 7 8 11 13
D8 22 20 18 16 14 10 17 13 10 11 9 8 8 8 7 7 6 6 6 9 11
D9 17 15 14 13 13 9 11 11 10 9 7 7 7 6 6 6 6 5 6 7 9
D10 (top) 13 14 14 13 13 10 9 8 8 7 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 8
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TABLE 2. Transaction cost estimates for the 500 largest U.S. stocks. 
Table 2 presents an overview of the single-trip transaction cost estimates in basis 
points for volume deciles of our sample of the 500 largest U.S. stocks resulting from 
the Keim and Madhavan model (Panel A) and the estimates for volume deciles of 
S&P500 stocks we received from Nomura Securities (Panel B). Volume deciles are 
based on stocks' three-month median trading volumes. It is assumed that the trades are 
closed within one day and the trade size is one million USD per stock by the end of 
2009. The trade size is deflated back in time with 10 percent per annum. 
Volume 
Decile 19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
Av
er
a
ge
Panel A. Keim-Madhaven average buy and sell
D1 (bottom) 14 6 2 1 8 8 2 -4 0 6 9 8 4 3 -4 -9 -11 -16 -5 51 4
D2 14 10 3 1 3 0 -1 -8 -8 -5 -4 -3 5 7 -3 -9 -12 -16 -4 46 1
D3 12 6 5 1 1 -2 -8 -11 -10 -8 -6 -3 3 -1 -8 -13 -16 -19 -2 40 -2
D4 8 7 3 0 0 -2 -7 -11 -12 -11 -11 -6 2 -1 -11 -15 -19 -19 -6 39 -4
D5 9 5 1 -2 -2 -3 -10 -12 -14 -15 -12 -10 0 -1 -11 -16 -21 -21 -10 28 -6
D6 6 1 -4 -7 -3 -7 -11 -15 -16 -16 -17 -11 2 -3 -14 -21 -18 -23 -7 26 -8
D7 1 -5 -6 -8 -5 -10 -12 -17 -17 -16 -20 -8 1 -2 -15 -16 -18 -22 -11 15 -10
D8 -7 -10 -9 -10 -9 -12 -15 -17 -19 -24 -21 -9 0 0 -14 -16 -21 -28 -8 16 -12
D9 -12 -10 -13 -15 -14 -17 -21 -25 -27 -30 -29 -16 -9 -12 -14 -24 -22 -27 -17 2 -18
D10 (top) -24 -25 -27 -24 -24 -27 -29 -34 -38 -39 -38 -19 -4 -22 -27 -30 -32 -34 -24 -16 -27
Panel B. Nomura buy or sell
D1 (bottom) 23 15 13 15 22 31 25 24 23 23 34 36 34 38 40 28 19 15 13 21 25
D2 12 11 10 12 16 22 13 14 16 27 26 20 17 17 14 11 10 9 10 14 15
D3 11 10 9 11 14 14 11 17 14 16 16 13 12 12 10 9 9 8 8 12 12
D4 10 9 9 11 12 12 12 12 12 13 12 11 10 10 9 8 8 7 7 11 10
D5 9 9 8 10 11 12 12 11 10 11 10 9 9 9 8 7 7 6 7 9 9
D6 8 8 8 9 10 13 12 11 10 10 9 8 8 8 7 7 6 6 6 9 9
D7 8 8 8 9 9 11 11 10 9 11 8 7 7 7 7 6 6 6 6 8 8
D8 8 8 7 8 9 11 11 10 10 9 7 6 7 7 6 6 6 5 6 7 8
D9 7 7 7 7 9 10 9 9 9 8 6 6 6 6 6 5 5 5 5 6 7
D10 (top) 7 7 6 7 8 10 9 8 8 7 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 5 6
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TABLE 3. Transaction cost estimates for the 1,000 and 600 largest European 
stocks. 
Table 3 presents an overview of the single-trip transaction cost estimates in basis 
points for volume deciles of our sample of the 1,000 (Panel A) and 600 (Panel B) 
largest European stocks resulting from the estimates for volume deciles we received 
from Nomura Securities. Volume deciles are based on stocks' three-month median 
trading volumes. It is assumed that the trades are closed within one day and the trade 
size is one million per stock by the end of 2009. The trade size is deflated back in time 
with 10 percent per annum. 
Volume 
Decile 19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
Av
e
ra
ge
Panel A. 1,000 largest European stocks
D1 (bottom) 75 75 77 77 77 71 75 77 79 72 74 76 71 79 88 76
D2 64 64 57 62 68 64 71 74 75 68 62 53 48 71 82 66
D3 46 46 43 48 51 54 60 63 63 48 48 39 35 56 75 52
D4 38 37 35 41 41 46 50 53 52 38 42 32 30 46 66 43
D5 33 31 31 34 35 40 44 43 43 31 35 27 26 38 56 37
D6 27 28 27 28 31 34 35 36 33 27 30 24 24 32 46 31
D7 24 24 24 25 26 27 28 29 27 23 25 22 23 28 40 26
D8 22 22 22 23 23 22 23 23 23 21 22 20 20 25 31 23
D9 22 21 20 21 21 19 20 20 20 19 20 19 19 21 25 20
D10 (top) 21 20 20 20 19 17 19 19 19 18 19 18 18 20 22 19
Panel B. 600 largest European stocks
D1 (bottom) 72 72 69 68 75 64 71 72 72 66 63 57 50 66 80 68
D2 54 51 44 50 53 55 61 62 62 48 46 33 30 48 67 51
D3 36 36 34 38 39 44 45 49 47 31 36 27 25 35 51 38
D4 30 29 29 30 32 34 36 35 39 27 29 25 24 30 42 31
D5 26 26 26 27 28 29 30 30 32 23 26 23 22 27 39 28
D6 23 24 24 25 25 24 25 26 26 21 23 21 22 26 34 25
D7 22 22 22 22 23 22 22 22 23 20 21 20 20 23 28 22
D8 22 21 21 22 21 19 20 20 21 19 20 19 18 21 25 21
D9 21 20 19 20 20 18 19 19 20 19 19 19 18 20 23 20
D10 (top) 21 20 18 19 18 16 19 19 19 18 18 18 17 19 21 19
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TABLE 4. Profitability of standard reversal investment strategies for the 1,500, 
500 and 100 largest U.S. stocks. 
Table 4 presents the weekly gross and net returns of the long portfolio, the short 
portfolio, and the long-short portfolio based on reversal quintiles for the 1,500 (Panel 
A), 500 (Panel B) and 100 (Panel C) largest U.S. stocks relative to the equally 
weighted average return of the stock universe. In addition, the table presents the 
turnover of the long-short portfolio. Net returns for each stock are computed at each 
point in time by taking the trading cost estimates associated with the stock’s volume 
rank using the schemes based on the Keim and Madhavan (1997) model and the 
transaction cost model of Nomura Securities listed in Tables 1 and 2. A minimum of 
zero is imposed for the transaction cost estimates resulting from the Keim and 
Madhavan model. 
Return long 
(bps)
Return 
short (bps)
Return long-
short (bps) t-stat
Turnover 
(%)
Panel A. Standard reversal strategy for 1,500 largest  U.S. stocks
Gross return 29.9 -31.6 61.7 8.7 677
Net return using KM estimates -35.3 31.1 -66.1 -9.2 "
Net return using Nomura estimates -54.6 49.6 -103.7 -14.5 "
Panel B. Standard reversal strategy for 500 largest  U.S. stocks
Gross return 35.3 -36.4 71.9 9.1 688
Net return using KM estimates 32.5 -33.6 66.4 8.4 "
Net return using Nomura estimates -2.7 0.3 -3.0 -0.4 "
Panel C. Standard reversal strategy for 100 largest  U.S. stocks
Gross return 43.7 -40.3 84.2 9.8 711
Net return using KM estimates 42.8 -39.4 82.5 9.6 "
Net return using Nomura estimates 17.1 -14.4 31.5 3.7 "
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TABLE 5. Profitability of “smart” reversal investment strategies for the 1,500, 
500 and 100 largest U.S. stocks. 
Table 5 presents the weekly gross and net returns of the long portfolio, the short 
portfolio, and the long-short portfolio based on reversal portfolios containing 20 
percent of the 1,500 (Panel A), 500 (Panel B) and 100 (Panel C) largest U.S. stocks 
relative to the equally weighted average return of the stock universe. In addition, the 
table presents the turnover of the long-short portfolio. The reversal portfolios are 
constructed using an approach that does not directly sell (buy back) stocks that are no 
longer losers (winners), but waits until these stocks are ranked among the top 
(bottom) 50 percent of stocks. Net returns for each stock are computed at each point 
in time by taking the trading cost estimates associated with the stock’s volume rank 
using the schemes based on the Keim and Madhavan (1997) model and the transaction 
cost model of Nomura Securities listed in Tables 1 and 2. A minimum of zero is 
imposed for the transaction cost estimates resulting from the Keim and Madhavan 
model.  
Return long 
(bps)
Return 
short (bps)
Return long-
short (bps) t-stat
Turnover 
(%)
Panel A. Smart reversal strategy for 1,500 largest  U.S. stocks
Gross return 27.7 -31.9 59.8 8.8 325
Net return using KM estimates -2.9 -1.4 -1.5 -0.2 "
Net return using Nomura estimates -10.9 6.8 -17.6 -2.6 "
Panel B. Smart reversal strategy for 500 largest  U.S. stocks
Gross return 30.7 -34.0 65.0 8.7 326
Net return using KM estimates 29.4 -32.7 62.3 8.4 "
Net return using Nomura estimates 13.7 -16.8 30.5 4.1 "
Panel C. Smart reversal strategy for 100 largest  U.S. stocks
Gross return 40.9 -36.7 77.9 9.4 337
Net return using KM estimates 40.5 -36.3 77.1 9.3 "
Net return using Nomura estimates 28.6 -24.4 53.1 6.4 "
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TABLE 6. Profitability of reversal investment strategies for the 1,000, 600 and 
100 largest European stocks. 
Table 6 presents the weekly gross and net returns of the long portfolio, the short 
portfolio, and the long-short portfolio based on reversal strategies for the 1,000, 600 
and 100 largest European stocks relative to the equally weighted average return of the 
stock universe. In addition, the table presents the turnover of the long-short portfolio. 
Net returns for each stock are computed at each point in time by taking the trading 
cost estimates associated with the stock’s volume rank using the schemes based on the 
transaction cost model of Nomura Securities listed in Table 3. Panels A, C and E 
present the results using a standard portfolio construction approach that is long (short) 
in the 20 percent of stocks with the lowest (highest) returns over the past week. Panels 
B, D and E show the results for a slightly more sophisticated portfolio construction 
approach that does not directly sell (buy back) stocks that are no longer losers 
(winners), but waits until these stocks are ranked among the top (bottom) 50 percent 
of stocks. 
Return long 
(bps)
Return 
short (bps)
Return long-
short (bps) t-stat
Turnover 
(%)
Panel A. Standard reversal strategy for 1,000 largest European stocks
Gross return 24.6 -25.3 50.0 7.7 672
Net return using Nomura estimates -113.4 106.5 -217.5 -33.4 "
Panel B. Smart reversal strategy for 1,000 largest European stocks
Gross return 28.2 -27.6 56.0 9.0 319
Net return using Nomura estimates -36.0 36.4 -72.1 -11.6 "
Panel C. Standard reversal strategy for 600 largest European stocks
Gross return 34.3 -34.6 69.2 9.6 683
Net return using Nomura estimates -81.3 76.8 -156.9 -21.8 "
Panel D. Smart reversal strategy for 600 largest European stocks
Gross return 35.0 -34.2 69.5 10.0 323
Net return using Nomura estimates -18.6 19.8 -38.3 -5.5 "
Panel E. Standard reversal strategy for 100 largest European stocks
Gross return 48.0 -48.1 96.5 9.8 700
Net return using Nomura estimates -24.9 22.9 -47.7 -4.9 "
Panel F. Smart reversal strategy for 100 largest European stocks
Gross return 46.3 -43.8 90.5 9.5 332
Net return using Nomura estimates 11.9 -9.7 21.6 2.3 "
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TABLE 7. Profitability of reversal investment strategies using a five-day 
rebalancing frequency. 
Table 7 presents the weekly gross and net returns of the long portfolio, the short 
portfolio, and the long-short portfolio based on reversal quintiles using a five-day 
rebalancing frequency for the 1,500 (Panel A), 500 (Panel B) and 100 (Panel C) 
largest U.S. stocks. In addition, the table presents the turnover of the long-short 
portfolio. Net returns for each stock are computed at each point in time by taking the 
trading cost estimates associated with the stock’s volume rank using the schemes 
based on the transaction cost model of Nomura Securities listed in Tables 1 (for the 
1,500 largest U.S. stocks) and 2 (for the 500 and 100 largest U.S. stocks).  
Return long 
(bps)
Return 
short (bps)
Return long-
short (bps) t-stat
Turnover 
(%)
Panel A. Standard reversal strategy for 1,500 largest U.S. stocks with a 5-day rebalancing frequency
Gross return 18.6 -22.5 41.2 7.3 306
Net return using Nomura estimates -17.6 13.9 -31.4 -5.6 "
Panel B. Standard reversal strategy for 500 largest U.S. stocks with a 5-day rebalancing frequency
Gross return 20.2 -23.7 44.0 7.1 310
Net return using Nomura estimates 3.5 -7.1 10.6 1.7 "
Panel C. Standard reversal strategy for 100 largest U.S. stocks with a 5-day rebalancing frequency
Gross return 25.3 -26.7 52.2 7.9 315
Net return using Nomura estimates 13.7 -15.3 29.0 4.4 "
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TABLE 8. Profitability of reversal investment strategies over subperiods 
Table 8 presents the weekly gross and net returns of the long portfolio, the short 
portfolio, and the long-short portfolio based on a reversal strategy over the period 
January 2000 to December 2009 (Panels A, B and C) and over our full sample period 
excluding the dot-com bubble from January 1999 to December 2001 and the credit 
crisis from January 2008 to December 2009 (Panels D, E and F). In addition, the table 
presents the turnover of the long-short portfolio. The reversal portfolios are 
constructed using an approach that does not directly sell (buy back) stocks that are no 
longer losers (winners), but waits until these stocks are ranked among the top 
(bottom) 50 percent of stocks. Net returns for each stock are computed at each point 
in time by taking the trading cost estimates associated with the stock’s volume rank 
using the schemes based on the transaction cost model of Nomura Securities listed in 
Tables 1 and 2.  
Return long 
(bps)
Return 
short (bps)
Return long-
short (bps) t-stat
Turnover 
(%)
Panel A. Smart reversal strategy for 1,500 largest  U.S. stocks over the period 2000 to 2009
Gross return 10.5 -22.6 33.2 2.7 317
Net return using Nomura estimates -19.4 8.5 -27.9 -2.3 "
Panel B. Smart reversal strategy for 500 largest  U.S. stocks over the period 2000 to 2009
Gross return 22.2 -30.7 53.0 4.0 320
Net return using Nomura estimates 7.1 -14.9 22.1 1.7 "
Panel C. Smart reversal strategy for 100 largest  U.S. stocks over the period 2000 to 2009
Gross return 40.0 -38.3 78.6 5.5 329
Net return using Nomura estimates 30.3 -28.5 59.0 4.1 "
Panel D. Smart reversal strategy for 1,500 largest U.S. stocks during non-crises periods
Gross return 29.1 -31.8 61.1 12.1 325
Net return using Nomura estimates -10.4 7.4 -17.8 -3.5 ''
Panel E. Smart reversal strategy for 500 largest U.S. stocks during non-crises periods
Gross return 27.5 -29.6 57.3 10.6 326
Net return using Nomura estimates 10.6 -12.6 23.2 4.3 ''
Panel F. Smart reversal strategy for 100 largest U.S. stocks during non-crises periods
Gross return 31.9 -28.4 60.4 9.6 337
Net return using Nomura estimates 19.1 -15.7 34.8 5.5 ''
 
  
 42 
TABLE 9. “Smart” portfolio construction using alternative trade rules. 
Table 9 presents the weekly gross and net returns of the long portfolio, the short 
portfolio, and the long-short portfolio based on reversal strategies relative to the 
equally weighted average return of the stock universe. In addition, the table presents 
the turnover of the long-short portfolio. The reversal portfolios are constructed using 
an approach that does not directly sell (buy back) stocks that are no longer losers 
(winners), but waits until these stocks are ranked above (below) the 30th (70th) 
percentile (Panel A); the 40th (60th) percentile (Panel B); the 60th (40th) percentile 
(Panel C); the 70th (30th) percentile (Panel D); and the 80th (20th) percentile (Panel 
E). Net returns for each stock are computed at each point in time by taking the trading 
cost estimates associated with the stock’s volume rank using the schemes based on the 
transaction cost model of Nomura Securities listed in Table 2. 
Return long 
(bps)
Return 
short (bps)
Return long-
short (bps) t-stat
Turnover 
(%)
Panel A. Smart reversal strategy for 500 largest U.S. U.S. stocks using 30/70 trade rule
Gross return 34.0 -37.2 71.5 9.1 479
Net return using Nomura estimates 8.1 -11.9 20.1 2.6 "
Panel B.Smart reversal strategy for 500 largest U.S. U.S. stocks using 40/60 trade rule
Gross return 32.1 -35.8 68.2 8.9 387
Net return using Nomura estimates 11.5 -15.4 27.0 3.5 "
Panel C. Smart reversal strategy for 500 largest U.S. U.S. stocks using 60/40 trade rule
Gross return 30.9 -33.0 64.1 8.9 275
Net return using Nomura estimates 16.7 -18.5 35.2 4.9 "
Panel D.Smart reversal strategy for 500 largest U.S. U.S. stocks using 70/30 trade rule
Gross return 28.1 -30.5 58.7 8.6 225
Net return using Nomura estimates 16.7 -18.6 35.3 5.2 "
Panel E. Smart reversal strategy for 500 largest U.S. U.S. stocks using 80/20 trade rule
Gross return 24.3 -27.3 51.7 8.2 170
Net return using Nomura estimates 15.8 -18.3 34.2 5.4 "
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TABLE 10. Fama-French regressions. 
Table 10 present the coefficient estimates and adjusted R-squared values of Fama-
French regressions of weekly gross and net returns of the long-short portfolio based 
on reversal portfolios containing 20 percent of the 1,500 (Panel A), 500 (Panel B) and 
100 (Panel C) largest U.S. stocks on the Fama-French risk factors (French, 2010) for 
market, size and value [see, e.g., Fama and French (1993, 1995, 1996)]: 
(1)  iitttti HMLbSMBbsRMRFbar ,321, ε++++= , 
where tir ,  is the return on reversal strategy i in month t, tRMRF , tSMB  and tHML  are 
the returns on factor-mimicking portfolios for the market, size and value in month t, 
respectively, a , 1b , 2b  and 3b  are parameters to be estimated, and ti,ε  is the residual 
return of strategy i in month t. The reversal portfolios are constructed using an 
approach that does not directly sell (buy back) stocks that are no longer losers 
(winners), but waits until these stocks are ranked among the top (bottom) 50 percent 
of stocks. Net returns for each stock are computed at each point in time by taking the 
trading cost estimates associated with the stock’s volume rank using the schemes 
based on the transaction cost model of Nomura Securities listed in Tables 1 and 2.  
Alpha (bps) t-stat RMRF SMB HML Adj.Rsq
Panel A. Smart reversal strategy for 1,500 largest U.S. stocks
Gross return 60.9 9.2 0.1 -0.2 0.0 5%
Net return using Nomura estimates -16.3 -2.5 0.1 -0.2 0.0 5%
Panel B. Smart reversal strategy for 500 largest U.S. stocks
Gross return 66.8 9.1 0.1 -0.2 0.0 3%
Net return using Nomura estimates 32.6 4.4 0.1 -0.2 0.0 3%
Panel C. Smart reversal strategy for 100 largest U.S. stocks
Gross return 80.7 9.9 0.1 -0.2 -0.1 2%
Net return using Nomura estimates 56.1 6.8 0.1 -0.2 -0.1 2%
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* We investigate the impact of trading costs on reversal profits. 
* Excluding small cap stocks significantly lowers trading costs. 
* Applying a more sophisticated portfolio construction approach lowers costs further. 
* Reversal profits can be up to 50 basis points per week net of trading costs.  
* Conventional trading cost estimates should be interpreted with caution in some 
cases. 
  
 
